Abstract -The emerging literature on transnational legal orders (TLOs) establishes new benchmarks for the elaboration of analyses regarding complex legal and economic issues which transcend the nation state and generate more (or less) settled institutional practices of cooperation. Authors working in this perspective propose that facilitating circumstances, precipitating conditions and a process of recursive cycles of actor collaboration and/or confrontation at different levels (transnational, national and subnational) may lead to the formation of a TLO. The paper argues that TLO theory remains limited in its ability to shed light on transnational economic consequences of monetary policies. A crucial situation that falls largely outside the reach of the analytical categories of TLO theory is the cross-border influence of monetary policy upon different markets and actors' strategic stances. The proposed paper calls this "monetary impacts" operating through "interportfolio relay" -an instance of which was what the Brazilian Minister of Finance in 2010 called "currency war". Having the above issues as a general background, the paper develops an empirical study of the reaction of Brazilian actors to the adoption, by the Federal Reserve, of the so-called "quantitative easing" policy. It then suggests how TLO theory can be expanded so as to include an analytical focus on instances of unidirectional cross-border interportfolio relay.
These and other conditions appeared to have introduced the risk of throwing the Indian economy into sudden disarray, in the event the outcome of the elections would have bought to power a coalition of parties not clearly committed to policies cherished by international investors. 1 The connections between financial policies having a transnational reach and local politics, however, do not affect only events related to electoral politics. At least since the 1930s, the so-called "beggar-thy-neighbor" currency depreciation has been subject to criticisms. Given their multifaceted nature, issues as those indicated above certainly pose a daunting challenge to contemporary legal scholars. Would there be a way to frame such issues legally so as to bring into consideration relevant political, economic, global and local factors, and also normative considerations involved in them, and at the same time offer responses as to what kind of institutional reforms would be legally meaningful or required in the face of complaints against "currency manipulation" by different countries?
1 See Reuters News (March 18, 2014) , Forbes Magazine (March 19, 2014) , Economic & Political Weekly Vol -XLIX No. 12 (March 22, 2014) . Clearly, such political vulnerability of India to cross-border capital movements is comparable to that of other regions. See, for example, for the case of Latin America, the analyisis of Martínez and Santiso (2003) . See also Parra and Santiso (2008) . 2 Cf. Eichengreen (2013) . Cross-border monetary impacts may be beneficial or detrimental to a national economy. In this paper, monetary impact will be used to designate the instances in which such impact has adverse effects on markets, public finance or the life of society in general. 3 For a discussion of the QE policy of Japan, see Spiegel (2006) . On Chinese exchange rate policies and criticisms they have been subjected to, including legal challenges brought before the International Monetary Fund, see Staiger and Sykes (2010) .
A body of interdisciplinary literature produced by legal scholars has been emerging in recent years with the aim of dealing analytically with complex issues in which the interactions of local and global players,as well as "middle-ground" negotiators and actors originate several relevant consequences which together are said to form "transnational legal orders" (TLOs) . 4 This emerging body of literature -which has been called "TLO theory" -proposes several analytical criteria which seem helpful in addressing complex issues related to processes by which TLOs are formed or transformed. It seems, however, that TLO theory misses opportunities to describe processes of policy and institutional change derived from cross-border monetary impacts, which may originate from unilateral action.
Indeed, a situation that seems to fall largely outside the reach of the analytical categories of TLO theory under its current form is the cross-border influence of monetary policy and financial flows upon different markets and actors' strategic stances. The present paper calls this "monetary impacts" -an instance of which was involved in what Brazilian Minister of Finance in 2010 called "currency war" and was later more hyperbolically referred to as "monetary tsunami" by Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff. 5 The paper therefore explores this heuristic shortfall of TLO theory and suggests ways to overcome it by adding to it other ideas and analytical tools.
In Section 2, the paper offers an account of the arguments and ideas on which TLO theory has relied to develop its framework of analysis. This description of TLO theory characterizes it as an outgrowth of analytical work that has delved into what it has called "recursivity of law". 6 In Section 3, the paper discusses the strategies deployed what appears to be a "blind spot" in TLO theory, which limits its ability to account for cross-border monetary impacts and their consequences, including economic spillovers that elicit policy reforms from governments. Suggestions of how to add to TLO theory ideas and analytical criteria that may be useful to address institutional and legal change deriving from cross-border transmission of monetary impacts are given in Section 5. A summary of the main arguments of the paper is offered in Section 6. Carruthers and Halliday (1998) and Halliday and Carruthers (2009) . Halliday and Carruthers incorporated the their 2009 book several ideas and analyses present in articles they published in previous years. See Carruthers and Halliday (2006) and Halliday and Carruthers (2007) . 8 Halliday and Carruthers (2009, p. xvii) highlight that the "most important" key issue around which they build their argument is "the relationship between states and global markets". This "key issue" arises from the troubling perception that the boundaries markets and states are not always perfectly aligned. Markets and states, they note (idem, p. xviii), "are not coterminus, and in fact some markets have become very much larger that any political jurisdictions. Many market transactions occur between polities as opposed to within them. This situation leads to a kind of 'mismatch' problem between nation-states and global markets. (…) Economic markets exceed the political grasp of any single nation state (…). As a result, for a given political jurisdiction or state actor, global markets are hard to regulate and difficult to control, and such markets have the power to frustrate or constrain public policies. Countries are vulnerable to economic interdependencies that they cannot govern."
-MAIN IDEAS AND SCOPE OF 'TLO THEORY'

-The Theory of Recursivity of Law
interactions related to global norm-formation and to local enactment and implementation of norms. The work of Halliday and Carruthers is therefore, in essence, a study of how institutional and legal change results from efforts of policy diffusion.
From a theoretical standpoint, Halliday and Carruthers criticize existing literature -including the works of authors writing under the "world polity theory", the "world systems theory", "postcolonial globalism" and "law and development". 9 The arguments advanced by these four theoretical perspectives criticized by Halliday and
Carruthers typically tend to emphasize the domination of local groups by global forces.
According to Halliday and Carruthers, 10 analyses appearing in that literature are flawed because authors overlook conflicts and contests among global actors and also because they pay no attention to the influence of key players upon the process of normformation, namely professionals drawing on their expert knowledge. In other words,
Halliday and Carruthers complain that these four approaches to law and international relations (world polity theory, world systems theory, postcolonial globalism and law and development) treat "the global" as no more than "a monolithic black box", ignoring
he battle within the global center", in spite of the fact that such battle is "always won by the center".
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The main contribution of the argument elaborated by Halliday and Carruthers 12 is their view of global law as "recursive". By this they mean that stabilization of adopted normative ideas applicable in a given issue area is the result of multiple and reiterative interactions between the global and the local. Such interactions are protracted in time, take place in a dimension which Halliday and Carruthers label "the middle" (of the relation between global and local), and is impacted by asymmetrical fields of power.
Out of reiterative interactions between local and global, most often by means of "intermediaries" having the capacity to "bridge the ideological or cultural divide between the global and local", 13 may result several possible discursive normative structures (law on the books) and several possibilities of actual norm implementation (law-in-action) . Intermediaries are thus seen as agents that may contribute to enhance the legitimacy of the normative outcomes. Halliday and Carruthers therefore derive 9 Halliday and Carruthers (2009, pp. 5-6) . 10 Halliday and Carruthers (2009 Halliday and Carruthers (2009, p. 422) . 16 As put by Halliday and Carruthers (2009, pp. 423-424) , "the possibility of varieties of capitalism and varieties of law should come as no surprise. It is obvious that distinct varieties of capitalism exist among advanced economies in North America and Western Europe, and it seems likely that further varieties may be found elsewhere. Variations in the organization of markets correspond to variations in law."
perceptions advanced in the book have quickly spurred further research and academic discussion around the notion of "recursive law" resulting from the interplay between global and local actors. 17 The articles gathered in Shaffer (2013) seek to refine conceptually, and to apply to different empirical instances of policy reform, the ideal of "recursivity" of law along the lines established by Halliday and Carruthers (2009) . Halliday and Shaffer (2015) 18 also engage in refining the analytical framework initially developed by Halliday and Carruthers.
Through these subsequent efforts, a theory of "transnational legal ordering" has been advanced. The arguments developed by these recent works seem to converge in the project to construct a comprehensive theory that aims to account for instances of what has been named "transnational legal order" (hence, the shorthand designation, "TLO theory"). As a result, TLO theory has incorporated many of the claims and concepts of the work on the recursivity of law under globalization. (ii) encompass hard and soft law, (iii) may be enacted by private and/or public bodies, (iv) often conflate power and reason and (v) carries a practical authority commensurate with the degree legitimacy of its mode of production.
In their effort of refinement of previously elaborated ideas, Halliday and Shaffer define a TLO as "a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jursdictions". 22 Moreover, they neatly differentiate conceptually "transnational law" (which is the law of transnational legal orders) from Westphalian international law, as well as from "global law". Whereas the coordinates of the Westphalian juridical system have been blurred in recent decades, the proposed notion of "global law"
remains misleading since supranational laws often are not truly global in their reach.
Halliday and Shaffer also clearly and expressly distinguish the concept of TLO from notions related to competing theoretical frameworks, namely: "regime theory", "world polity theory" and "global and transnational global pluralism". Thus the main differences between regime theory and TLO theory is that the former remains statecentric, excludes interactions of domestic politics with international processes and fails to deal with law directly with, or in ways that avoid oversimplification of, legal phenomena and ideas. TLO theory contrasts with regime theory in all those aspects, since "recursivity" is actor-centric, looks at the interactions between domestic and international politics, and also takes into consideration, in elaborate terms, the complexities of legal ideas and practices. The distinctions between TLO theory on the one hand and world polity theory and global and transnational legal pluralism, on the 20 These five dimensions of state change are: (i) changes in substantive law and practice, (ii) changes in the boundary between state and market, (iii) changes in the institutional architecture of the state, (iv) changes in professional expertise and in the role of expertise in governance and (v) changes in associational patterns and normative frames related to transnational monitoring, surveillance and reporting practices. See Shaffer (2013a) . 21 Halliday and Shaffer (2015) . 22 Halliday and Shaffer (2015, p. 5). other, refine earlier criticisms developed by Halliday and Carruthers (2009) In addressing the "formation and change of TLOs", Halliday and Shaffer (2015) recognize that transnational law-making does not exist constantly and is not a continuous process. Hence they propose that "facilitating circumstances" and "precipitating conditions" are elements that may trigger recursive cycles of norm formation and implementation until "settlement" (stabilized institutionalization) is reached.
25
With respect to "settlement" or "institutionalization" of TLOs, Halliday and Shaffer (2015) indicate that, once a process of recursive cycles of actor collaboration and/or confrontation at different levels (transnational, national and subnational) is under way, it may lead to the formation of a TLO, which may at some point in time become a more stable institution. But they recognize that different degrees of stability may be reached in different circumstances.
Thus TLOs are described as either "more", or "less", settled according to whether the meaning and practical import of relevant norms is more, or less, stabilized in institutional practice, leading to various possible situations of "concordance"
(concordance, which may be high or partial; and discordance) of norms across levels (transnational, national, subnational) of interaction. Also, Halliday and Shaffer 26 explore different possibilities of "alignment" among ways in which actors relying on different 23 See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005) . 24 Cf. Shaffer (2013a, p. 10) . 25 Halliday and Shaffer (2015, pp. 32-35) . 26 Halliday and Shaffer (2015) . The picture of order-formation that TLO theory develops is multifaceted and context-bound, since it proceeds from empirical observation of actual practice and includes many levels of discourse and action that become interwoven, many kinds of actors, different kinds of participants to a non-continuous and contingent process of norm formation and institutional change. Moreover, TLO theory incorporates a concern with how power and resistance strategies become enmeshed with discourse and procedures of intermediation at play in the formation of TLOs. The theory of TLO formation also contrasts in interesting ways with, and provides a promising alternative to, other theoretical perspectives that miss out on several of the aspects of international and local politics incorporated into the very notion of a TLO. For all these reasons, TLO theory is a highly attractive and promising framework of analysis, corroborated by its application to empirical work that has begun to emerge.
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However, TLO theory itself so far seems to have neglected how certain economic relations, which are kept largely secluded from the arenas of actor-centered "intermediation", have an important impact on the very processes by which "order" is formed and transformed in many countries and among them. This topic will be developed below.
27 See empirical chapters in Shaffer (ed.) (2013). Canada, China, the euro area, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S. was rolled out to cut short-term interest rates. Subsequently, with rates approaching the so-called "zero lower bound", central bankers began seeking policy alternatives.
-THE BRAZILIAN ATTEMPT TO SUBJECT MONETARY POLICY TO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COORDINATION
-The Global Economic Context
28
Fiscal policy measures were also adopted. According to a study by the International Labor Organization (ILO), the size of fiscal stimulus among the G20 countries in the months that followed the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank reached $2 trillion, amounting to about 1.4% of the world GDP. 29 In the U.S., a major package of fiscal stimulus was structured under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, adopted in 2009. But authorities were not satisfied that fiscal measures would be sufficient to impart enough momentum to economic recovery. As highlighted by the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, in an important speech he gave at the London School of Economics in 2009, "fiscal actions are unlikely to promote a lasting recovery unless they are accompanied by strong measures to further stabilize and strengthen the financial system." 30 Among the "strong measures" mentioned by Bernanke, he referred specifically to the removal of "troubled assets" from financial institutions' balance sheets through public purchase of such assets.
Bernanke's reference to "public purchases of troubled assets" is key to much of what economists have called "unconventional monetary policy", which includes prominently a policy that became known as "quantitative easing" (QE). As indicated by
Bowdler and Radia, QE essentially involves "large-scale asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank money". 31 The Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan have put in place programmes of such large-scale asset 28 Cf. Bowdler and Radia (2012 Junior et al. (2013) . 38 Fonseca (2010) .
"deindustrialization of Brazilian exports" was taking place: a fall in the exports of manufactured products as a share of total exports. In his article, the chief economist of FISSP characterized such deindustrialization of exports as a direct result both from
Chinese exchange rate misalignment and from "the choice made by the U.S. of dumping more than 600 billion dollars in the economy (quantitative easing 2)".
39
The controversies underlying assessments of the international impacts of unconventional monetary policy have lingered on. Academic economists joined discussions in specialized journals as well as through op-eds published in newspapers and blogs. Thus, for example, Pedro Rossi, a professor of economics from a prestigious Brazilian university (Unicamp), rebuked arguments of renowned American economist, Paul Krugman, on the matter of "currency wars". According to Rossi, the phrase "currency war" was not a misconception. 40 Using the phrase to describe current facts was not a silly gesture of Brazilian authorities (as was apparently suggested by Krugman). 41 The phrase, argued Rossi, actually "laid bare the disfunctionalities of the international monetary system and its asymmetrical character". Rossi insisted that the language used by Brazilian authorities aimed at highlighting the fact that the international monetary system is "hierarchical and dysfunctional" and that it works to the detriment of emerging economies, which have to "bear the effects of the monetary policies of the center". Rossi's conclusion was that authorities in emerging economies were justified in adopting "defensive measures" (e.g., a tax on cross-border capital flows) to offset the impacts of monetary policy pursued by the countries in the center.
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On the diplomatic front, the Brazilian government developed a strategy under which the issue of trade-related aspects of exchange rate policy would be officially taken to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 43 In principle, the idea was to transform 39 Fonseca (2010) . 40 Rossi (2014) . Cf. Krugman in The New York Times (2013). 41 See Rossi (2014) . According to Krugman, "currency war" is a nonissue. In his own words: "OK, people have been asking me where I stand on the "currency war" issue. My answer is that it's all a misconception, and it would be a very bad thing if policy makers take it seriously." See Krugman in The New York Times (2013). 42 Rossi (2014) . As one would expect, what the "true" economic facts are about cross-border influence of QE has remained to a certain extent a matter of controversy. Brazilian academic economists have often sided with the view that unconventional monetary policy adopted in the global North is detrimental to economic interests of industries in the global South. See, e.g, Prates and Cunha (2011) . On the other hand, a team of economists of the Brazilian Central Bank has resorted to intensive use of models (statistical tests) to advance the notion that QE has had "positive effects" on the Brazilian economy. See Central bank of Brazil (2013) . 43 See World Trade Organization (2011). See also Pereira and Allard (2012) .
the discussion about the links between monetary policy and trade policy from a purely political into a legal argument and eventually progress toward norm enactment and implementation.
The Brazilian proposal was presented to the WTO in 2011. It outlined two "pillars" by reference to which institutional action in the WTO should be organized.
Activities of the first pillar would be aimed at fostering discussion based on a review of relevant economic theory and case studies that addressed the issue of the relationship between exchange rates and international trade. As stated in the Brazilian proposal, Brazilian diplomats were convinced that "exchange rates do influence, in some cases significantly, the foreign trade performance of any given country". 44 So in order to consolidate this view institutionally, they proposed that the WTO's Working Group on
Trade, Debt and Finance should produce a review of specialized theory and empirical evidence. Whatever the merits of these proposals, the efforts of Brazilian diplomats failed.
Major global powers, including China, were not in favor of further developing discussions of trade-related aspects of monetary and exchange-rate policy in the WTO.
The prevalent view was that such matters should be discussed within the IMF. 
-CROSS-BORDER TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY IMPACTS AS A BLIND SPOT IN 'TLO THEORY'
-The Emergence of Global Finance
A theory of "recursive law", subsequently refined into "TLO theory", is supportive of this basic view about how institutions and policies change across the world today. The conflicts between the Brazilian and other interests around trade-related aspects of monetary policy, however, seem to defy explanations provided by the theory of "recursivity" of law, incorporated into TLO theory.
The question of whether the Brazilian attempt to subject monetary and exchange rate policy to international coordination was legally warranted is not at issue here.
Rather, it is the question of whether the analytical framework of TLO theory is appropriate to be employed in the investigation of the concerns of Brazilian industrialists and policy makers, which they attempted to capture under the term "currency war".
Contrary to what is suggested by TLO theory, the transformation of order by means of cross-border monetary impacts does not result from "negotiated" normative materials and explicitly designed legal reform. In fact, cross-border monetary and financial relations have become largely secluded from contestation and hence from arenas of TLO formation and explicit legal reform that result from a process of negotiation. An account of how "free" global finance has grown beyond the reach of regulation typical of "embedded liberalism" that characterized the international postWorld War II settlement, with its crucial directive that proscribed free speculative crossborder capital movements, helps to clarify this point.
As indicated by Helleiner, 47 after an international settlement was reached at the end of World War II, under which speculative cross-border capital movements remained "illegal" because of the risk of economic disruption they were associated with, international economic accommodation led to corrective devaluations across Western Europe in 1949. This helped the creation of the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950. As a mechanism of coordination of payment systems, the EPU was instrumental 47 See Helleiner (1994) .
in strengthening the balance-of-payment position of countries in the region and was part of the "cautious move to European dollar convertibility". The U.S. also opposed a proposal to recycle petrodollars through the IMF, based on criteria aimed at insuring prudent and equitable allocation of these funds.
According to Helleiner, the position of U.S. officials against monetary cooperation and in favor or market freedom throughout the 1970s reflected their interest in using speculative capital movements to induce policy reforms in other countries. As expressed by Helleiner, the U.S. "perceived speculative capital movements as an important central tool in [its] strategy of encouraging foreigners to absorb the adjustment burden required to correct the country's large current account deficits. 56 See, e.g., Brummer (2012) . 57 As expressed by Helleiner (2015, p. 232) : "It is difficult (...) to describe the TFLO as having become highly 'institutionalized' (in the sense that [Halliday and Shaffer] use the term) not just because of ongoing changes in the normative content of the order at the transnational level. [There are also] substantial challenges relating to normative settlement and compliance at the national level. Difficulties in encouraging compliance with the TFLO are not new, but they have been intensified in the wake of the 2008 crisis by: the expanding functional scope of the order; the diffusion of financial power in the state system; the widening of membership in key governance institutions; and heightened domestic politicization of financial regulatory issues. These developments have undermined the effectiveness of a number of tools that have encouraged compliance with the TFLO's soft law in the past". 58 See Helleiner (2015) . 59 Financial News (2009).
It was a fundamental refusal by a hegemon to cooperate. And effective cooperation never took off in the area of global financial and monetary governance.
-Analytical Limitations of TLO Theory
TLO theory, which has grown out of a "recursivity theory of law", certainly aspires to have a say in all issues related to transnational governance-building, but it remains limited in its ability to analyze crucial matters of global or transnational financial governance. As already indicated in section 4.1, characterizing the existence of a "transnational financial legal order" (TFLO) is certainly spreading too thin the categories of TLO theory. Several aspects of the means through which institutional and legal change takes place as a consequence of cross-border transmission of monetary impacts inevitably remain outside of the analytical scope of TLO theory. Some points about this important limitation of TLO theory will be briefly addressed below.
 Halliday and Carruthers note that the focus of their analysis has special emphasis on "the middle" (of the relations between the global and the local). Their research effort is largely oriented to render explicit what the processes of "intermediation" between global forces and local structures are, how they work and what practical consequences originate from them. In fact, as they explicitly indicate, a substantial part of their bookthe whole of Part III -"is an exercise in 'mapping the middle'" in order to "explain the contingency of globally induced law reforms". 60 Halliday and Shaffer also make clear that TLO theory is interested in new forms of social connection forming "processes [that] spur the development of intersecting, transnational economic, social, regulatory, and judicial networks" in which participants "act as intermediaries between national and transnational governance arenas". Yet, paradoxically, TLO theory has no analytical equipment to look at "the middle" of processes that connect, on one end, operations whereby central banks in the global North purchase billions of dollars' worth of mortgage-backed securities, and, at the other end, industries in the global South pile up their manufactured products and face the prospect of disinvestment, while workers lose the jobs. Indeed, "the middle" between "powerful" central banks at the global center and local economies around the world, in the case of QE and cross-border transmission of monetary impacts, does not involve "intermediation" in the sense the word is used in TLO theory analytics, but does require instead the deployment market-based financial strategies, which are many and diverse.
 TLO theory, as was seen above, is "actor-centric", in contrast to a close competitor, regime theory, which has remained "state-centric". 61 But policy reforms or adjustments occurring as a result of cross-border monetary impacts cannot be analyzed under an actor-centric approach. The process that connects the global (global markets) and the local (local markets and local systems of public finance) has no "actors". Instead, "the middle" of what connects the two extremes of cross-border transmission of monetary impacts has only flows of price signals and coded information in a structured context of rules, not all of which are publicly known. (In fact, such rules very often are not even legally knowable, due to their private or secret legal status).
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 TLO theory is all about the analysis of "migration of law across borders". 63 But cross-border monetary impacts do not imply such migration of law across borders. It typically takes place in the absence of any cross-border "migration of law". Arbitrage opportunities that become available to speculators are enough to cause devastating cross-border monetary impacts.
 TLO theory has incorporated the idea of "recursivity" of law-making and implementation as a central feature of its framework. It therefore describes "transnational legal processes" as "the processes through which [transnational legal] norms are constructed, carried and conveyed, always confront national and local processes, which may block, adapt, translate or appropriate a transnational legal norm and spur its reassessment". 64 In contrast to these features of transnational legal processes, institutional or policy changes resulting from cross-border monetary impacts do not involve discursively intermediated and contested mutual adjustments between local law and some "model" global (or transnational) law. So there isn't a norm to be blocked, adapted, translated or appropriated and elicit reassessments. There are financial impacts that spread through certain financial channels and eventually translate into outcomes in the real economy, often spurring policy and legal reform.
 TLO theory posits that a series of recursive cycles of norm formation come into play and may eventually reach some degree of "settlement". As put by Shaffer, "[s] ome sort of settlement may occur that persists over time until that settlement is destabilized". 65 In the case of institutional change resulting from cross-border capital flows, there is no norm to be 61 Halliday and Shaffer (2015, pp. 22-23) . 62 The transparency of credit rating agencies' rating methodologies would be an example. See discussion in White (2010) . 63 Shaffer (2013, p. 1) . 64 Shaffer (2013, pp. 1-2) . 65 Shaffer (2013, p. 14) .
"settled". Change is not the outcome of a history of reiterative adaptation of some discursive background (a norm), it is only an absolutely contingent reaction to price swings.
 Recursivity in TLO theory may involve foiling, resistances, adaptations of a model norm and associated scripts, all of which contribute to the notion that, whenever there is settlement, it must be regarded an expression of a "negotiated" order. 66 In contrast to this, cross-border transmission of monetary impacts results from unilateral action.
Generalizing from Helleiner's characterization of the strategy deployed by the U.S. during the 1970s in the area of international financial governance (see above), the exercise of market-based structural power does not leave room for negotiation: monetary authorities of a hegemon unilaterally steer market forces to achieve what direct negotiations are unable to accomplish. Where monetary impacts strike and no venue for cooperative discussion about norms is available, there is no "foiling", no political resistance, no effective contestation. Only recourse to rhetorical protest -of which the phrase "currency war" used by Brazilian authorities is an example -remains available.
It seems clear, therefore, that TLO theory as a set of concepts, ideas and analytical tools produced to enable legal scholars to unpack the middle-ground relations that connect global actors to local groups remains quite limited when it comes to crossborder transmission of monetary impacts. On the other hand, TLO theory remains extremely useful, perhaps crucial, to tackle many issues and processes of contemporary law and institutional change in a revealing and useful way. Yet certainly the heuristic value of TLO theory can be enhanced if its framework is expanded to include new analytical criteria that can be of help in unpacking "the middle" of global monetary and financial relations.
-MIXING 'TLO THEORY' AND 'LAEP'
In recent years legal scholars from the global South have begun developing new ideas and insights that incorporate local concerns, but benefit from, and at times 66 In one of their descriptions of these characteristics of recursivity, Halliday and Carruthers (2009, pp. 29-30 ) state the following: "Our investigations indicate that ostensibly weak countries can foil hegemonic power. Countries develop repertoires of resistance, weapons of the weak through which they manage to carve out zones of independence form external pressure. In these openings, they deviate and design, reject and adapt, conform and contest as their situation permits. These repertoires (…) reinforce our argument that globalization is contested and negotiated". (i) Markets, including financial markets, should not be taken as abstract entities or "black boxes", but rather as empirical practices, with distinct rules that often regulate matters such as who can be a market participant, precisely what kinds of procedures count as valid exchanges, what is allowed to be exchanged in a given market, etc.
(ii) All markets are embedded in nonmarket institutions, such as states, courts, professional associations.
(iii) But markets themselves have an "institutional" fabric of their own, mainly formed by partially overlapping (hence discontinuous) networks of contracts, formed by short-term contracts and/or longerterm contracts in the sense that contractual performance may be of longer or shorter duration, or parts of performance may be deferred in time.
(iv) "Contractual contents" are normative stipulations with legally binding force. As such, normative stipulations structure relational expectations and are a guide to relational performance. 69 Contractual contents are either privately negotiated by the parties to a contract, or "injected"
67 See Castro (2014) . 68 Castro (2014) . 69 Relational expectations refer to expectations that individuals and groups form regarding the actions or attitudes (performance) of other individuals or groups or organizations.
into contracts by law from public deliberation: mainly from the legislative, administrative (decisions and policies adopted by regulatory agencies) or judicial processes, or a combination of them.
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The binding force of contractual contents is deemed a consequence of legally valid contract formation, amendment or termination.
(v) Contractual contents will be considered "public-interest contents" if they are "injected" from public deliberation, while contractual contents that are privately negotiated are deemed "private-interest contents".
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The LAEP approach also proposes that all economically relevant contracts have two types of clauses: the "utility clause" (U clause) and the "monetary clause" (M clause). 72 The U clause refers to normative stipulations regarding utilities (goods and services). The M clause records normative stipulations about relational performance with respect to money and financial assets. Real-economy contracts are those contracts in which the contents of the U clause are real-economy utilities (goods and services). By contrast, financial contracts are those contracts in which contents of the U clause are either money or financial assets. 73 In nonfinancial contracts, the normative stipulations regarding real-economy utilities comprise the contractual contents of the U clause, while the contents of the M clause are stipulations bearing on money or other financial contracts or both.
Contracts can be combined in "portfolios". Often portfolios are professionallypackaged contractual aggregates formed by clusters of contracts interconnected by strategically designed intercontractual linkages that presuppose the legally binding force of contracts. Portfolios are supposed to generate consumption opportunities and/or opportunities of investment. They correspond to collections of contracts which are present in empirically existing contractual networks but are "earmarked" according to some investment strategy that designs and manages intercontracual linkages. Porftolios are carriers of combinations of normative stipulations and hence relational expectations 70 As put by Castro (2014, p. 47) :" [I] in contemporary market economies no business can produce or sell, say, pharmaceutical drugs, automobiles, smart phones or television sets without a host of regulations (in areas such as public health, environmental protection, consumer protection and so on) coming into play. All such policies add public-interest contents (…) and can only be suppressed or modified by means of public procedures subject to public legal oversight: they cannot be changed or cancelled by means of private contractual bargaining." 71 See Castro (2014) . 72 Both the utility clause and the monetary clause are proposed as "ideal-typical" clauses to be used as analytical tools. 73 Financial assets are themselves financial contracts.
regarding both utility contents and monetary contents of contracts. Some will be private-interest contents, others will be public-interest contents.
In It is important to understand that price movements may come as response to changes in private investment strategies, but they may also result from public policy decisions. Money market interest rates upward or downward movements occur largely in response to monetary policy decisions. Here is a stylized description of this process:
Since, in their ordinary operation, banks engage in transactions in the interbank market [in the U.S., the so-called federal funds operations] and decide where to allocate funds -whether in government securities carrying a given interest rate or some other asset, such as short-term interbank credits etc. -the base rate [sometimes also called policy rate] is contractually transmitted to all other contracts banks engage in and thus to consumer credit, corporate credit and so on.
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In light of this example, it becomes clear that both tax charges (or tax credits) and policy-induced variations in interest rates (the "base rate" or "policy rate") are public-interest monetary contents "injected" into contracts through the implementation of economic policies. Thus such public-interest monetary contents will vary according to tax policy, monetary policy and financial regulation.
74 Castro (2014) .
Moreover, it also becomes clear that large-scale speculative or policy-induced price movements may -by means of interportfolio relay -"implode" portfolios in affected markets and may indeed throw into disarray a whole national economy.
"Implosion" occurs because contractual networks unravel as portfolios cease to generate expected opportunities of consumption and/or investment. This possibility is connected to the fact that, in the areas of financial regulation and monetary policy, public policies may take the form of sets of newly created "structured portfolios" designed to attain certain projected financial results by means of (sometimes cross-border) interportfolio relay. Economic policy and financial regulation can design structured sets of portfolios with several strategically conceived "public-interest contents". And, in many cases, the interportfolio relay affects relational performance in portfolios of foreign economies where the parties to relevant contracts do not match "the public" in the name of which the original policy and regulations were designed at the global center. Lawyers do (...) play a critical role in the world of finance. They help structure new instruments, advise market participants on the legality of their actions and devise strategies for them to minimize the costs of regulatory restrictions. Lawyers also serve as expert witnesses to Congress and work in committees or at regulatory agencies that are charged with developing new legislation or regulations.
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Thus, one important conclusion that may be derived from the above arguments is that "intermediation", in the sense the term is used in TLO theory in its current form, should be enlarged to include many new elements derived from analysis of the legal set up of portfolios. Special attention should be given to criteria by which portfolios are "packaged" unilaterally by monetary authorities and to how attendant monetary strategies play out through interportfolio relay.
75 Pistor (2012, p, 63) .
Figure 2 -Elements of TLO formation to be included in "expanded TLO theory"
-FINAL REMARKS
This paper has described TLO theory as an outgrowth of a theory of recursivity of law. The assessment offered of TLO theory is that it ingenuously elaborates a framework of analysis that is useful to reveal with clarity how norm-making and implementation in the world today follows patterns that cannot be precisely anticipated and may foster the creation of many variations of institutions and policies, with different degrees of practical and conceptual stability and varied degrees of comprehensiveness of given issue-areas. For these reasons, TLO theory remains an attractive set of ideas.
However, the paper also showed that TLO theory in its current form remains
limited in its ability to analyze processes through which important policy changes take place and indeed whole programs of governments may be swept out or restricted.
Specifically, TLO theory does not seem able to equip legal scholars with tools to develop useful analysis of cross-border monetary impacts, which are an expression of what authors have diversely called "market-based 'structural' power" and "monetary power", and which may be described as the result of interportfolio relay flowing from portfolios strategically structured by monetary authorities.
Therefore, suggestions were made whereby elements from the "legal analysis of economic policy" can be added to TLO theory and produce an "extended" version of it.
An "extended TLO theory", it is suggested, may be capable of enabling legal scholars not only to canvas processes of "mediation" of transnational legal ordering that are actor-centric, but also "unpack" other specifically monetary and financial processes that currently lay outside the purview of most analytical approaches of norm formation in the context of globalization.
